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I.

INTRODUCTION

O

n June 17, 2022, Ukrainian forces successfully used a U.S.-supplied Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile to attack and sink a Russian resupply ship that
“almost certainly” carried weapons and reinforcements bound for Snake Island in the Black Sea. 1 Two weeks later, on June 30, Russian troops evacuated the small outpost. 2 Moscow had claimed the retreat from Snake Island
was a “gesture of goodwill” in advance of recognizing a humanitarian corridor to permit the safe export of grain from Ukraine. But Ukraine said the
Russians were forced out as their position on the barren rock had become
untenable without logistical support. Ukraine raised its flag on Snake Island
on July 4. 3
The setback for Russia was apparently tied to the oldest of military challenges—force sustainment during combat. The capture of Snake Island may
help Ukraine to position anti-ship cruise missiles south of Odessa to weaken
the Russian stranglehold on the port city. 4

1. Stephen Mcilkenny, Ukraine Conflict: MoD Confirm Destruction of Russian Vessel Near
Snake Island as Ukrainian Forces “Neutralise Russia’s Ability to Establish Sea Control,” THE SCOTSMAN (June 21, 2022, 10:47 AM), https://www.scotsman.com/news/world/ukraine-conflict-mod-confirm-destruction-of-russian-vessel-near-snake-island-as-ukrainian-forces-neutralise-russias-ability-to-establish-sea-control-3739250; see Heather Mongilio, DoD: Ukraine
Sinks Russian Supply Ship With Harpoon Missile, USNI NEWS (July 1, 2022, 4:56 PM),
https://news.usni.org/2022/07/01/dod-ukraine-sinks-russian-supply-ship-with-harpoonmissile?utm_source=USNI+News&utm_campaign=ea45d08f55-USNI_NEWS_DAILY
&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0dd4a1450b-ea45d08f55-230852577&mc_cid=
ea45d08f55&mc_eid=962cf58401.
2. Mary Ilyushina et al., Russian Forces Withdraw From Ukraine’s Snake Island, WASHINGTON POST (June 30, 2022, 3:08 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/2022/06/30/russia-withdraw-snake-island-ukraine-war/.
3. David Harding, Ukraine Raises Its Flag Over Snake Island Once Again, THE INDEPENDENT (July 4, 2022, 4:10 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
ukraine-raises-flag-over-snake-island-b2115350.html.
4. See Agence France-Presse, Russia Quits Snake Island, In Blow to Blockade of Ukraine Ports
FRANCE24.COM (June 30, 2022), https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220630-russia-quits-snake-island-in-blow-to-blockade-of-ukraine-ports.
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II.

THE ATTACK

The resupply ship that never reached Russian forces on the island is believed
to be the Russian naval tugboat Spasatel Vasily Bekh. 5 The ship had a loaded
displacement of 1670 tons. Part of the Black Sea Fleet, the Vasily Bekh was
launched in 2016 and commissioned in 2017. 6 The tugboat is designed to
provide towing services for ships in distress, firefighting at sea and ashore,
freshwater and electrical supply to other vessels, and to evacuate injured personnel. It carried a complement of twenty crewmembers with capacity for
thirty-six more people and could carry tons of supplies.
Coming after the sinking of the Black Sea flagship Moskva on April 14, 7
the strike on the Vasily Bekh underscores the Russian Navy’s inability to establish sea control in the western area of the Black Sea. The Moskva was the
largest Russian warship damaged by enemy fire since 1941, when the Luftwaffe damaged a Soviet battleship in Kronshtadt. 8 The Russian withdrawal
from Snake Island also demonstrates the importance of combat logistics.
While Russia maintains internal lines of communication that can feed the
Russian war machine inside Ukraine, the Russian element that occupied
Snake Island had to be supplied from the sea, raising questions about the
rules for targeting ships supporting the armed forces in war.
III.

TARGETING COMBAT LOGISTICS

As a Russian Navy tugboat, the Vasily Bekh was a public vessel and naval
auxiliary of the armed forces, and therefore was lawfully subject to attack by
the armed forces of Ukraine. 9 Auxiliary vessels are not warships, but they are
owned or under the exclusive operation or control of the armed forces. 10
5. Mcilkenny, supra note 1.
6. Rescue Tug Spasatel Vasily Bekh (SB-739), KCHF.RU: BLACK SEA FLEET,
https://www.kchf.ru/eng/ship/rescue/sb739.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2022).
7. See generally Carole Landry, The Sinking of the Moskva, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 14,
2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/14/briefing/russia-ukraine-war-flagship-mariupol.html.
8. See Factbox: The “Moskva,” Russia’s Lost Black Sea Fleet Flagship, REUTERS (Apr. 14,
2022, 7:00 PM EDT), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moskva-russias-lost-blacksea-fleet-flagship-2022-04-14/.
9. See generally U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 114M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 8.6.1 (2022).
10. Id. ¶ 2.3.1.
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Such State owned or State operated ships are used for the time being only
on government non-commercial service and provide support to military
forces, including provision of troops, fuel, armament, ammunition, and
other supplies into the combat zone. They can also be used as floating bases
and sustainment platforms for some types of naval operations, such as mine
countermeasures.
Auxiliaries are under the command of a civilian master rather than a naval officer. While they enjoy sovereign immunity, they are not protected
from attack during armed conflict. Civilian mariner crew members of such
ships are accredited to the armed forces and if captured are protected as
prisoners of war. 11 If naval auxiliaries are captured, title to the ship vests
immediately in the captor government and they may be converted directly
for use by the enemy as war booty without the requirement to go through a
prize court in admiralty. 12 Unlike warships, however, naval auxiliaries are not
entitled to belligerent rights at sea, such as the right to capture enemy merchant ships as prize or the right to attack the enemy. 13
IV.

TARGETING CIVILIAN MERCHANT SHIPS

In light of the shortfall in naval logistics and force sustainment during the
current conflict, Russia has been exploring options for optimizing a mixture
of public and private ships to meet fleet combat requirements. On May 20,
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov stated that Russia is reviewing
its naval doctrine to expand the role of the Russian-flagged merchant fleet
in support of the armed forces.
Merchant ships are those vessels not owned or operated exclusively by
the State and are engaged in normal commercial trade, fishing, passenger
transportation, and other non-military operations. The experience of the
Russian Navy during the current “special military operation” in Ukraine illustrates the value of employing civilian vessels as a force multiplier to the
Military-Maritime Fleet (Voyenno-Morskoy Flot—VMF). Borisov stated
that all Russian-flagged commercial ships should be built or refurbished so
that they are dual-use vessels normally involved in civilian trade but called
up to aid the Russian Navy when necessary. Although the civilian fleet has
always been available to supplement the Russian Navy during armed conflict,
11. Id. ¶ 11.6.
12. Id. ¶ 8.6.1.
13. Id. ¶ 2.2.1.1.
540

Targeting Logistics Ships

Vol. 99

Admiral Vladimir Valuyev, a former commander of Russia’s Baltic Fleet, said
the change in policy could facilitate the transition.
As the Russian Navy turns toward its merchant fleet to provide combat
logistics, it raises a different set of rules than those that apply to naval auxiliaries. During armed conflict at sea, enemy-flagged merchant ships, or neutral merchant ships owned or operating on behalf of the enemy, have enemy
character. 14 This status means that they are liable to prize capture by opposing belligerent forces anywhere outside of neutral territorial seas. These ships
are subject to capture if they are enemy flagged or are owned or operated by
the enemy but flagged in a neutral State. Enemy merchant ships may be diverted by belligerent forces to a designated port or may be captured at sea
with a prize crew installed. The documents of the captured vessel, including
the log and cargo manifest, should be secured. These papers should be used
in court proceedings during prize adjudication. Unlike in the case of captured
naval auxiliaries, prize adjudication is required before an enemy merchant
ship can be converted to the use of the enemy. When military circumstances
prevent capture and adjudication as prize the merchant ships may be destroyed after all possible measures have been taken to provide for the safety
of passengers and crew. 15
While naval auxiliaries may be targeted at all times outside of neutral internal waters and territorial seas based on their status as part of the enemy
fleet, enemy merchant ships are liable to attack only if they take a direct part
in the hostilities or take action against enemy vessels and aircraft. Likewise,
if the Russian naval forces use merchant ships flagged in a neutral State those
vessels may also be liable to capture as prize or attacked as lawful targets if
they resist visit and search or take a direct part in hostilities.
Merchant vessels that are owned or controlled by a belligerent possess
enemy character and are liable to prize capture. 16 (Neutral ships that resist
the belligerent right of visit and search to determine the enemy character of
the ship or cargo also acquire enemy character). Neutral merchant vessels
taking a direct part in the hostilities on the side of the enemy or acting in any
capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to the enemy forces are subject to
attack. 17

14. Id. ¶ 7.5.
15. Id. ¶ 8.6.2.1.
16. Id. ¶ 7.5.2.
17. Id. ¶ 7.5.1.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The strike on the Vasily Bekh highlights the importance of logistics ships in
armed conflict, the status of these vessels during armed conflict, and the
rules for their prize capture or targeting. Naval auxiliaries like the Vasily Bekh
are public vessels of the armed forces. Such ships may be targeted during
armed conflict due to their status alone. The U.S. Military Sealift Command
also operates dedicated naval auxiliaries that perform a variety of support
functions, and they too are liable to attack (or capture as war booty). The
U.S. Military Sealift Command operates strategic sealift auxiliaries to supply
the force, including container ships, dry cargo and ammunition, and rollon/roll-off ships, and other combat support ships to ensure the flow of
forces in theater. Like the Vasily Bekh, these ships are subject to attack in an
armed conflict and protecting them from Russian submarines would pose a
defining challenge to NATO defensive operations.
Russia’s plans to leverage greater support from merchant ships also implicates the law of naval warfare. Russian-flagged merchant ships are liable
to capture by Ukrainian naval forces, and they may be converted to use after
adjudication of prize in a court of admiralty jurisdiction.
The Russian merchant fleet has 1,155 ships and 7.7 million deadweight
tons and could serve as an effective force multiplier for the Russian military
services. 18 China’s merchant fleet is among the top ten largest in the world,
with almost ninety-two million deadweight tons and 5,130 ships. 19 Decimated by uncompetitive costs of operation resulting from the Jones Act, the
U.S. fleet is shockingly small and shrinking. The number of U.S. oceangoing
commercial ships in the U.S. merchant fleet fell from 282 vessels to
182 ships since 2000. 20 This means that while Russia and China can supplement their auxiliary naval forces with national-flagged merchant ships, the
United States would find that option more challenging.
This situation is ironic because unlike Russia and China, which enjoy
internal lines of communication, U.S. requirements for force replenishment
18. Russian-Flagged Fleet Numbers 1,155 Cargo Ships With Total Deadweight of 7.7 Million
Tonnes, PORTNEWS (July 27, 2020), https://en.portnews.ru/news/299357/#:~:text=As
%20of%201%20July%202020,CNIIMF)%2C%20told%20IAA%20PortNews.
19. Top 10 Flag States 2020, LLOYD’S LIST (Dec. 3, 2020), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1134965/Top-10-flag-states-2020.
20. Loren Thompson, Dwindling U.S. Merchant Fleet Is a Crisis Waiting to Happen, FORBES
(Oct. 8, 2019, 9:55 AM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/
2021/10/08/dwindling-us-merchant-fleet-is-a-crisis-waiting-to-happen/?sh=665295a52a
8d.
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depend on a massive logistical flow to Asia and Europe. American forces
operate forward, along the first island chain running from Japan to the Philippines, and on NATO’s eastern border in Europe. Sustainment of these
forces likely would require merchant shipping. Like Russia, the United States
may also resort to contracts with merchant carriers to provide force sustainment. These merchant ships would also be liable to capture by the enemy
during armed conflict, and they may be attacked and destroyed if they resist
capture.
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